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RELATIONS VADUZ - BERN AND THE PARTICIPATION OF 
LIECHTENSTEIN IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
PROCESS. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE 
 




Liechtenstein is an example of a European microstate, and is also characterised by a 
specific type of relationship with his neighbour – Switzerland. Reorientation of the foreign 
policy of Vaduz towards Bern was a consequence of the First World War. The most 
important of the agreements between both countries was a Customs Treaty concluded in 
Bern 1923. One year later Swiss franc was introduced as a legal tender in the Principality. 
Relation with the Swiss Confederation have not imprinted a negative stigma on the 
participation of Liechtenstein in the process of European integration. The Principality is, for 
example, since 1995 a member of the European Economic Area (without Confederation). In 
the future, potential membership of Liechtenstein and Switzerland in the European Union 
cannot be excluded. This would require a change in attitude of the government in Bern. 
Currently, the connection with Switzerland is just one of the options for Vaduz, but not the 
only one.  
 
Key words:  Liechtenstein, Switzerland, European integration, customs union 
 
Introduction 
Liechtenstein is in many respects a typical example of a European 
microstate. In addition to other various attributes, the smallest countries of the 
Old Continent are also characterised by a specific type of relationships with their 
neighbours1. They are mostly of political (representation on the political arena), 
economic (customs and monetary union) and military (providing defence) 
nature. Being bound together with their neighbours, such small countries could 
effectively survive on the political map of Europe. Therefore, it is fully justified to 
call these bonds long lasting, although their evolution or perhaps even 
                                                          
*  Assoc. prof. Krzysztof Koźbiał, Ph.D., is a Deputy Head for Education at the Institute of 
European Studies of the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, ul. Jodłowa 13, 30-252 
Kraków, Poland, e-mail: krzkozb@ces.uj.edu.pl.  
 
1  Andorra is an exceptional case as it is linked to its two neighbours. 
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termination cannot be ruled out. Thus, one should ask whether Liechtenstein is 
able to function in the integrating Europe without Switzerland. Is the relationship 
of the two countries going to survive in its present form or is it subject to 
changes? Finally, are there any reasons allowing various scenarios for the 
future? 
 
1 The relationship between Liechtenstein and Switzerland 
before the year 1918 
Liechtenstein, existing within the present borders since 1712, was 
traditionally bound to its eastern neighbour. This resulted mainly from the 
Liechtenstein family’s ties with the Habsburgs and the fact that the rulers 
resided on a permanent basis in Vienna until 1938. 
The consequence was a closer connection with Austria in other areas of 
interest as well, typical of the relations between small countries with their 
neighbours. In 1852, the two countries signed an agreement abolishing customs 
duties and taxes and moving the Austrian border controls as far as the Rhine. 
Since 1880, the Viennese diplomats represented Liechtenstein, a few years 
later the courts of Austria became the courts of appeal for this Alpine 
Principality. Austrian currency was also adopted (Koźbiał, 2009, pp. 198-199). 
The bonds with Austria ended as a consequence of the First World War and 
in its aftermath. Defeated and cut down territorially, the eastern neighbour was 
no longer an attractive partner in far-reaching cooperation, even for a 
microstate. As a result, the existing customs, political, monetary and postal 
agreements were broken2. The internal events leading to the creation of political 
parties were equally significant. One of these parties opted very clearly for 
severing close relations with Vienna. From the perspective of decades, the 
reorientation of the foreign policy of Vaduz towards Bern appears to be 
understandable and logical. It resulted in tangible benefits to the Principality.  
The far-reaching 19th Century agreements with Austria did not mean that the 
relations with the western neighbour were completely neglected. On the 
contrary, they were already visible in the first decades of the 19th Century. The 
first agreements were signed with the neighbouring Swiss cantons: Graubünden 
                                                          
2  Customs agreement expired on September 1, 1919; a new postal agreement was signed in the 
spring of the following year. The Austrian crown stopped to be used as it was rapidly losing its 
value. 
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and St. Gallen. They concerned the freedom to change the place of residence. 
Subsequent agreements were enforced by natural factors, and in 1837, an 
agreement referring to the regulation of the Rhine was signed with the canton of 
St. Gallen. A year later, an agreement on freedom of changing the place of 
residence was signed with the entire Swiss Confederation (Batliner, 1973, p. 
24). 
At the turn of the 60s and 70s of the 19th Century some ventures bringing 
together neighbours were undertaken: three bridges were built on the Rhine 
(from the Principality’s side in Vaduz, Balzers and Bendern). In 1874, the 
neighbours agreed on the possibility of settling of their citizens, 12 years later 
free practice of the profession by medical personnel was allowed on both sides 
of the Rhine. These proceedings were positively perceived by the citizens, 
which resulted in their hesitant attitude towards extending the relations with 
Austria (Koźbiał, 2010, p. 210). It was realised that there existed a viable 
alternative to the relationship with the eastern neighbour.  
The relationship between the two countries also concerned subordination to 
the Church. Until its own bishopric was established (1997), the Principality had 
belonged to the diocese of Chur. 
The First World War and its consequences proved to be crucial. Generally 
discernible shortcomings, the lack of employment and even life prospects 
caused waves of migration. Seasonal workers sought employment abroad, 
mainly in Switzerland. They later joined the supporters of closer cooperation 
with Switzerland. The fact that at the turn of 1918 and 1919 Switzerland was a 
more reliable partner and at the same time a protector of the Principality began 
to be recognised also by the authority of the state. 
 
2 Establishing a customs union and further development of 
contacts 
The most important decisions, in force to the present day, were made in the 
years 1919-1923. Interrelationships involved political and economic aspects. 
Firstly, in 1919, the government of the Principality applied to Bern with a request 
for the microstate to be represented by the Swiss diplomacy. The request was 
accepted and the solution is in operation to the present times3. The Principality 
                                                          
3  Three forms of presence of Liechtenstein in the international forum have developed: through direct 
representation by Switzerland (its representative is involved in the negotiations), through the 
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has its representatives wherever it has been considered desirable for the 
interests of the state. Currently these are Bern, Berlin, Vienna, Washington, 
Brussels (the EU), Strasbourg (the Council of Europe), New York (at the UN) 
and Geneva (permanent mission at EFTA). 
In 1920, in accord with the legislation of the Principality, the Swiss franc 
replaced the Austrian currency used before. This was a practical decision, 
especially important from the point of view of the citizens who already used the 
currency on a daily basis as more secure legal tender not undergoing the loss in 
value (Gesetz, 1924)4. The currency was used in the calculation of the state 
budget, and to pay all liabilities. The decision, however unilateral, was 
stabilising the country in economic terms. Monetary agreement between the two 
countries became known only in 1980, the so-called Monetary Treaty 
(Währungsvertrag, 1981). 
Then, in November 1920, the Alpine neighbours entered into an agreement 
known as the Postal Treaty (Übereinkommen, 1922). Despite close cooperation, 
the Principality retained the possibility to emit its own postage stamps, highly 
valued by the collectors also nowadays. 
These agreements created a favourable atmosphere for talks on enhancing 
cooperation. The change of government in Vaduz also had a positive influence 
on this process. After the elections of 1922, the strongest group in the Landtag 
was the Volkspartei, which opted for considerable deepening of the relations 
with the western neighbour. Its leader William Beck had advocated closer 
cooperation with the neighbour for several years. The negotiations on the 
customs agreement were supported by the opinions of recognised international 
academic authorities who emphasized, above all, the economic benefits of a 
possible agreement to the microstate (Koźbiał, 2010, p. 214). 
An important aspect of the relationship, though not regulated by any 
agreements, but by practice, was the impact of the Swiss political solutions on 
the political system of Liechtenstein based on a new constitution adopted in 
1921. This impact suggests the conclusion that some systemic solutions still 
used today have their roots in the political system of Confederacy. 
                                                                                                                                      
possible presence of representatives of the Principality, but the plenipotentiary for specific issues is 
held by a Swiss diplomat, and finally through the direct participation of Liechtenstein’s diplomats. At 
present, the third form is prevailing. 
4  Swiss franc was introduced as a legal tender in 1924. 
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Practically, under the influence of the Swiss political scene the formation of 
the party system of the microstate took place. Educated in Helvetia, lawyer 
Wilhelm Beck became the leader of a group called VP (Volkspartei), strongly 
supporting the democratisation of the political system, weakening of the position 
of the ruler, as well as strengthening the bonds with Switzerland. It had an 
impact on future bilateral ties, the more so that up to the end of the 20s of the 
20th Century the group set the tone of the external policy when it signed the 
main agreement with Helvetia (Koźbiał, 2013, p. 43, 179). 
Under the influence of the Swiss example, the political system of 
Liechtenstein also adopted solutions characteristic for direct democracy in the 
form of a referendum and civic initiative. The first referenda in the Rhetian Alps 
region took place in 1919. In subsequent years, this instrument has been used 
so often that presently in terms of the number of referenda held the state holds 
the second place, just after Switzerland. 
The most important of the agreements was a Customs Treaty concluded in 
Bern on the 29 March 1923. It came into effect on the 1 January of the following 
year. Its principal provisions are as follows (Vertrag, 1923): 
 inclusion of the Principality in the Swiss customs territory (Article 1); 
 application of the legislation on customs matters in Liechtenstein, as 
well as of international agreements in the field of customs and trade 
(Articles 4, 5, 7); 
 while implementing the regulations Liechtenstein is entitled to the same 
rights as the Swiss cantons (Article 6); 
 prohibition of establishing by Liechtenstein its own customs 
arrangements for the duration of the validity of the agreement with 
Switzerland (Article 8) (Prange, 2000, p. 62)5; 
 taking over customs control of the microstate on the border with Austria 
by the Swiss customs administration (Article 11). 
The agreement was drawn up for five years with the possibility of renewal if 
neither of the parties renounced it one year before that date (Article 41). 
Currently, the notice period is also one year. 
The experience of the following decades shows clearly that the agreement 
                                                          
5  The regulation was changed only in 1990 and since then Liechtenstein could be a partner in 
separate agreements or a member of international organisations proposing customs relations 
without breaking the links with Switzerland. 
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has stood the test of time. It has been especially beneficial to the Principality 
which, being such a small country, is not forced to bear the costs associated 
with maintaining a separate customs administration. At the same time, this is the 
solution used by other European state organisms defined as microstates. 
The customs union of the two countries should be classified as the most 
important interconnection. Later, however, new contracts were drawn. An 
example is the 1941 agreement, under which the citizens of Helvetia were able 
to settle in Liechtenstein without any hindrance, which for a long time placed 
them in a privileged position in relation to citizens of other countries. Today, the 
Swiss are the largest group of foreigners in the Principality, there are nearly 
3600 of them, representing almost 29% of all foreigners in the country 
(Bevölkerungsstatistik 2013, p. 12). 
In the 90s of the 20th Century due to the discussions on the creation of the 
European Economic Area (EEA), and because Switzerland did not enter into 
this Agreement, the customs treaty between the two countries was subject to 
adjustment processes. The most important change was to grant priority to the 
laws of the EEA over the Swiss federal law; in case of the products originating 
from the EEA countries customs officers had to apply the regulations of the EEA 
(Friese, 2011, pp. 209-210). It was a decision of utmost importance. In 1995, 
following the Swiss example Liechtenstein introduced VAT and sanctioned in 
this regard the relevant Swiss legislation (Friese, 2011, pp. 211-212). 
While analysing the relationship between Switzerland and Liechtenstein, it 
should be noted that they are characterised by the lack of common authorities. 
In result, the relations ought to be treated as special and privileged. Switzerland 
is a prevailing party having the impact on the creation of legislation, which also 
applies to its smaller neighbour (Gyger, 1975, p. 61). On the other hand, the 
microstate is in power to renounce the agreement if it considers it detrimental to 
its interests. Therefore, these are not unconditional and everlasting bonds.  
Contacts Vaduz-Bern did not only affect economic affairs. Agreements in 
other areas of life were reached as well. Not being the subject of this article, 
they are not discussed here; however, one can mention, among others, the 
abolition in the Principality of privileges for the Swiss as an example of 
measures aiming at the restriction of influx of foreigners onto the local labour 
market. Since November 1981, the Swiss have been subject to the same 
limitations as the citizens of other countries, and nowadays their status is on a 
par with the nationals of EEA countries. Finally, the two countries have become 
members of the Schengen Area. The Swiss Confederation acceded to it in 
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2008, the Principality of Liechtenstein in December 2011. 
It is difficult to provide an explicit characterisation of the relationship between 
the two countries. Undoubtedly, there is a partial inequality of the parties. Terms 
such as patronage, favouritism or quasi-protectorate seem to be not exactly 
relevant (Gyger, 1975, pp. 62-64). Currently, these contacts, their scope and 
degree of dependence of Liechtenstein from Switzerland, are completely 
different from what they used to be 90 years ago. In the opinion of the author, 
Vaduz is not doomed to cooperate with Bern at all costs. At the moment of 
severance of the links with Austria after the First World War, the choice was in 
fact only one - close relationship with the other neighbour. 
 
3 Liechtenstein and the integration processes in Europe 
The Principality of Liechtenstein was gradually undertaking the attempts to 
open up to wider integration processes ongoing on the Old Continent in the 
post-war period. It joined the continental integration groups only in the 90s of 
the past century. Not accidentally, these decisions are associated with the 
person of Prince Hans Adam II, who succeeded to the throne in November 
1989. 
Thanks to the participation of Switzerland in the EFTA, Liechtenstein was 
included in the provisions of the so-called special protocol providing for its 
involvement in the Convention of the EFTA (Ławniczak, 1971, p. 32). Similarly, 
through the links with the western neighbour the Free Trade Agreement 
between Switzerland and the EEC from 1972 was also in force on the territory 
of Liechtenstein. This was a crucial factor in the economic relations of the 
Principality as it allowed duty-free access of industrial products to the EEC 
countries markets. From the point of view of Vaduz, the most important part of it 
was the access to the markets of Germany and Austria. The Principality became 
a fully-fledged member of the EFTA in 1991. At the same time, the talks were in 
progress about its joining the economic area that was just being created 
(Koźbiał, 2012, pp. 20-22; Breuss, 2011, p. 131-133). 
The idea of joining the EEA aroused controversy at the foot of the Rhaetian 
Alps. Unknown was Switzerland’s attitude towards the new initiative. Prince 
Hans Adam supported the idea of entering the organisation which would bind 
Liechtenstein more strongly than before to the integration process. He believed 
that the decision of the society should be positive regardless of the outcome of 
voting in Bern. However, it came to a dispute over the date of the referendum, 
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because the parliament and the government opted for it to be held following the 
analogous voting in Switzerland. Eventually, the people of the Principality were 
not guided by the negative decision of the Swiss. On the 13 December 1992, 
the majority of the citizens voted in favour of joining by their microstate the 
European Economic Area. 
The Swiss society’s decision was opposite, which aroused doubts 
concerning the membership of the Principality in two different customs zones. 
The adjustment in this regard was the subject of negotiations with Switzerland. 
The problem was sorted out by changing the contents of the Customs Treaty of 
1923 and concluding successive contracts with Bern. The EEA Council then 
adopted the so-called adjustment protocol. Agreements with Switzerland 
enabled actual accession of Liechtenstein to the international conventions and 
organisations that dealt with the spheres coinciding with customs agreement of 
both parties. To guarantee proper implementation of the EEA Agreement a joint 
commission was established. The only agreement with the Confederation that 
was adapted to the EEA Agreement was the Monetary Treaty (Gstöhl, 1999, pp. 
156-157; Friese, 2011, pp. 241-242; Frommelt, Gstöhl, 2011, pp. 13-16).  
Liechtenstein finally joined the European Economic Area on the 1 May 1995, 
after having accepted the changes in the subsequent referendum. In addition, in 
this case, the Principality has the right to withdraw from the agreement after a 
12-months’ notice. 
The agreement provides special regulations for the Principality. In some 
areas (e.g. veterinary matters), the microstate is not subject to the regulations of 
the EEA in their entirety, but to the agreements with Bern, or those made 
between Switzerland and the EU. Restrictions apply also to the labour market in 
Liechtenstein, due its size very sensitive to the influx of workers from abroad. 
Vaduz has the possibility of introducing restrictions on the right of residence 
(Friese, 2011, pp. 246-247). It seems a mutually satisfying solution, because the 
country, if it allowed full freedom of movement of people, could become the 
target place of residence for a number of EEA nationals wishing to pay much 
lower taxes than in their homelands. The membership in the Area also meant 
implementation of the EU legislation. By the end of 2011, there were already 
6300 such deeds (Koźbiał, 2012, p. 23). This can be perceived as a kind of 
prelude to the membership in the European Union in the indefinite future. 
As a complement to the involvement of Vaduz with Brussels, the agreement 
on the taxation of interest earned on savings was signed in 2003. Based on this 
agreement 1/4 of the collected amount stays the country in which the savings 
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are deposited, the remainder is transferred to the home country of the owner. 
Such agreements were also signed with other European microstates in order to 
avoid transferring their money out of the EU (Koźbiał, 2012, p. 17). 
The final step towards the Principality’s participation in the process of 
continental integration was the incorporation into the Schengen Area in 
December 2011 (Schengen, 2011). Thus, Liechtenstein after fulfilling all the 
criteria became the 26th – and the last so far (until the 31 March 2015) – 
member of the Area. 
The analysis of the participation of this Alpine microstate in the integration 
processes of the Old Continent allows to observe its strong business 
relationship with the European partners. In the 4th quarter of 2014, Liechtenstein 
exported goods worth 896.6 million francs. The EEA share in this sum 
amounted to 59.0%. The largest recipients of goods from this country were 
Germany (24.2%), the USA (14.0%), Austria (9.8%) and France (9.0%). On the 
other hand, imports amounted to 489.1 million francs. The Principality was 
importing goods mainly from the member states of the European Economic 
Area (85.9%), mostly from Germany (39.3%), Austria (30.7%) and Italy (3.7%) 
(Amt für..., 2014)6. These figures clearly show the economic links with Europe. 
In fact, the economy of the Principality is dependent on the European markets, 
which are the recipients of products from the Rhaetian Alps. It became apparent 
when the global crisis started in autumn 2008 with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers bank. The links with the EEA market resulted in a noticeable drop in 
exports from Liechtenstein in 2009, by as much as 27.4% and in imports decline 
by 21.8%. Thus, the value of exports in this country almost equalled that from 
2003 (Statistisches, 2014, p. 171)7.  
It is also important to recognise issues related to the European integration in 
the official foreign policy objectives of the Principality. These include both 
relations with its neighbours, which the state authorities consider one of the 
main priorities, as well as the participation in the EEA and the association within 
the Schengen zone. This relation is referred to as an important factor that leads 
to the realisation of an objective, which is the confirmation of the sovereignty 
and independence of the state. At the same time, an indirect target is to 
                                                          
6  Statistical data do not include Switzerland, with which the Principality constitutes a common 
customs territory. 
7  In 2010, the Principality’s exports increased by of 7.9%, in 2012 only 1.2%. 
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maintain the economic position, among other things, through the access to 
broad markets and the internationalisation of trade in the analysed country. 
The Government of the Principality does not exclude other scenarios, as 
evidenced by the establishment of the working group dealing with the European 
integration in 2009. Liechtenstein participates in regular political dialogue with 
the EU, both at ministerial as well as expert level. The challenge for the future is 
probably participation of the EFTA States in a variety of specialised agencies 
and institutions, which sometimes are simply advisory bodies in relation to the 
European Commission. The same applies to the future financial impact of the 
European cooperation on the Principality, especially when it comes to the 
possible anticipated growth of expenses. The involvement in the process of 
European integration does not change the fact that it is Switzerland who is 
considered the most important partner with whom the microstate is connected 
not only by numerous agreements of economic and social character but also 
continuously deepened political contacts (Prioritäten, 2012, pp. 13-17, 27-28). 
According to the author, it is the economic factor that will decide in the future 
about Liechtenstein’s stance on the process of integration in Europe. Thus, the 
microstate dependent on the common market will be more interested in the 
efforts to return to sustainable economic growth, even if this requires a closer 
integration.  
 
4 Scenarios for the future 
The answer to the question about the prospects of further participation of the 
Principality in the integration process of the continent is complex. In our opinion, 
it depends on both the further development of the European Union itself and on 
the relations between Brussels and Bern. These appear to be complicated and 
the present solution in form of bilateral agreements, by all means acceptable to 
Switzerland who selects the areas of cooperation that seem to be the most 
beneficial, is presently optimal from the point of view of Bern (See: Tomczyk, 
2012, pp. 217-233). The possibility of Switzerland’s accession to the EU is now 
highly unlikely. This does not mean that it can be completely ruled out. 
The experience of the past over 20 years of relations between Bern and 
Vaduz seems not to allow the exclusion of any scenario of events, including 
even the membership of Liechtenstein in the European Union. The situation 
differs significantly compared with the year 1992 when Vaduz decided for the 
first time to join the EEA. Currently, the connection with Switzerland is just one 
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of the options, since even the relationship with the EU closer than the existing 
one is to be seriously considered. Thus, Vaduz is no longer "doomed" to only 
one possibility. Paradoxically, thanks to the integration the opportunities for 
external activities of this microstate have expanded, at least in the economic 
sphere.  
Future relations between the EU and Liechtenstein, taking into account the 
impact of the Swiss policy, should be considered according to the following 
scenarios: 
 
4.1 Maintaining the status quo 
In this case, Liechtenstein remains a member of the EEA, but does not join 
the European Union, whereas Switzerland continues outside the two areas of 
cooperation. This would mean no change in hitherto mutual contact, and 
probably only quantitative increase of the EEA and the EU legislation 
implemented in the Principality. 
 
4.2 Switzerland joins the EEA of which Liechtenstein is 
already a member 
With the accession of the Confederation to the European Economic Area, 
both countries would be the members of the Area. From a practical point of 
view, such decision would in no way change the position of Vaduz, whereas 
from the point of view of Bern it would mean a step towards deepening the 
involvement in the processes of co-operation on the continent. 
In the current situation, it is difficult to suppose that Switzerland will decide to 
make such a decision. Undoubtedly, this would mean a kind of shift in the 
current policy of the government in Bern. 
 
4.3 Liechtenstein and Switzerland both join the European 
Union 
According to this scenario, the two countries could become members of the 
Union. In view of the relations between them, the most sensible solution would 
be their simultaneous accession to the organisation. It seems disputable and 
controversial whether such a move is possible, especially on the part of Bern. In 
our opinion, such development is difficult to imagine now. Taking into account 
economic factors, this move would be unprofitable for Switzerland who would 
undoubtedly become a net contributor to the EU budget. However, given the 
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dynamic development of international relations, this option should not be ruled 
out in the future. 
It should be kept in mind that Helvetia is not completely excluded from 
specific areas of cooperation with Brussels. They are included in the so-called 
Swiss bilateral agreements with the European Union (Bilaterale I of 1999 and 
Bilaterale II of 2004), which has proved to be a relatively favourable solution for 
the Alpine country. However, in case of such a decision, the most important 
decision-maker - due to the nature of the political system - is the Swiss society 
that would have to give their consent in a national referendum. Without a doubt, 
it would be quite a landmark for the European integration process. Currently, 
there is no indication that the Swiss could opt for such a move (see more: 
Tomczyk, 2014, pp. 81-97) 
In the survey conducted in November 2014 on a representative sample of 
more than 1200 people, only 6% considered joining the Union as a desirable 
objective for further development of mutual relations. The European Union and 
its institutions do not enjoy the trust of the respondents. On a scale of 1 to 10 
the level of trust in the EU stands at 4.9. In this situation, it is difficult to imagine 
Helvetia’s membership in the Union. At present, it seems decidedly out of the 
question (Beziehungen 2015, pp. 2-7). 
In Liechtenstein, the decision about the accession to the EU would also 
require a vote of the citizens. Given the results of the referenda on joining the 
EEA, most likely it will not be a problem to get the majority of votes in favour of 
such a solution. 
 
4.4 Liechtenstein joins the European Union 
This solution has never been ruled out by the authorities of the Principality, 
and still has never become the objective of its foreign policy. The country’s small 
size would not be probably an obstacle to the potential realisation of this 
scenario. It seems that the size of the state is the most important problem on 
the way to the accession in the Union, though from a formal point of view, it is 
not an obstacle. Currently, the smallest in terms of population EU Member State 
(Malta) has 11 times more inhabitants than the Alpine microstate. In the present 
institutional structure of the EU, the Principality’s active participation in the 
organisation would be difficult, perhaps even impossible. Undoubtedly, modest 
human resources would create a problem in terms of staffing the positions in the 
EU institutions and the creation of personnel and consultancy background for 
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the functioning of the state in the structures of integrating Europe. 
 
4.5 Liechtenstein leaves the EEA and values its relationship 
with Switzerland above the membership in the Area 
In the author's opinion, also this scenario seems unlikely. Even as a member 
of the EEA Liechtenstein still maintains its close links with the western 
neighbour. Staying in the Area does not jeopardise the relations with Bern, one 
cannot speak of conflicting decisions in this sphere of interests. In a word, being 
in the EEA does not preclude relations with Switzerland, therefore, Lichtenstein 
can hardly be expected to step out of the EEA. It would be detrimental to the 
economy of the microstate since due to the membership in most extensive 
European economic cooperation zone the enterprises of the Principality gain 
access to over five hundred-million-consumer market. 
While analysing possible scenarios for the Principality’s stance on the 
process of integration of the continent in the future, one should consider the 
most important determinants of the policy of Vaduz. In the author's opinion, the 
membership in the EEA is definitely beneficial to the microstate, first because it 
protects its economic interests. The main benefit is the participation in the 
European common market – a factor of no small importance for any export-
geared national economy of a small size. At the same time, not being a member 
of the European Union, Liechtenstein can be flexible about decisions 
concerning the areas in which it would possibly like to extend its share in the 
integration. Moreover, the EU side has been inclined to make some, already 
mentioned, concessions to the smaller partner. 
On the other hand, the participation in the EEA, without membership in the 
EU, has several downsides. The most significant seems to be relatively limited 
right to co-decide on developmental trends in the Area. 
Therefore, the economic considerations undoubtedly prevail when it comes 
to the further membership of Liechtenstein in the EEA. Even close ties with the 
western neighbour do not seem to outweigh these benefits, as already proved 
by the convincing statistical data on external trade relations with the member 
states of the Area. 
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, it should be noted that so far the relations of Liechtenstein 
with the Swiss Confederation have not imprinted a negative stigma on the 
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participation of the Principality in the process of European integration. On the 
contrary, in the early 60s of the 20th Century, when the EFTA came into 
existence, Switzerland was the promoter of the idea of including the 
neighbouring microstate in the agreement. This was due to the specific contacts 
between the two countries and their establishment of customs union. 
The turning point came in the 1990s when only Liechtenstein was a member 
of the EEA. The existing arrangement seems to satisfy both sides. The 
relationship Vaduz-Bern does not entail negative consequences as far as the 
broader participation of the Alpine Principality in the European integration is 
concerned. 
In the future, changes in the attitude of the two countries towards European 
integration and even their potential membership in the European Union cannot 
be excluded. This would indeed require, first of all, a change in attitude of the 
government in Bern, as well as a change in attitude of the Swiss society 
towards possible accession to the EU. The authorities in Vaduz however, are 
not, as in bygone days, bound by the Swiss decisions, which they expressed 
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